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THE RIGHT TO “DO POLITICS” AND
NOT JUST TO SPEAK:
THINKING ABOUT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
FOR POLITICAL ACTION
ROBERT F. BAUER
INTRODUCTION
For a half century, campaign finance jurisprudence has turned on
the Supreme Court’s distinction between political contributions and
1
campaign expenditures. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld the
Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on political contributions to
candidates for federal office and struck down various provisions that
had limited campaign expenditures made by candidates, campaigns,
2
and individuals. In upholding the contribution limits, the Court
concluded that contributions implicate rights of speech and
3
association, but only up to a point. It was “speech by proxy” through
which the donor surrendered control of the use of the funds, and
therefore the precise message funded, to the recipient. By contrast,
the expenditure is purer expression, because the funder and the
spender are the same and the money spent travels from the wallet of
Copyright © 2013 Robert F. Bauer.
 Distinguished Scholar in Residence and Senior Lecturer at the New York University School of
Law; partner of Perkins Coie, L.L.P. This Article is a revised version of a presentation made to
the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy at the Duke University School of Law on
April 11, 2013.
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. Id. at 143.
3. See id. at 20–21 (finding that “a limitation upon the amount that any one person or
group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction
upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication,” because the contribution
serves as a general expression of support but “does not communicate the underlying basis for
the support”); id. at 22 (noting that the Act’s $1000 limitation on independent expenditures did
not prevent “like-minded persons [from] pool[ing] their resources in furtherance of common
political goals,” but it did preclude “most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of
their adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the
freedom of association”).
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the spender directly to the airwaves or into the mailbox. Under
Buckley, Congress has more leeway to limit campaign contributions
and less leeway to regulate expenditures—particularly where the
expenditures are independent of candidate control or influence.
This framework has withstood the critiques directed against it for
4
many years. Four of the current Justices of the Supreme Court have
declared their readiness to reconsider the distinction between
5
contributions and expenditures, yet the criticisms of Buckley
continue to be conducted within the very terms it set. The arguments
remain primarily about adjustments in the balance to be struck
between government regulatory interests and First Amendment
6
speech protections. Proponents of de-regulated politics propose to
protect more speech by granting greater First Amendment
protections to contributions. Supporters of more active regulation of
campaign spending come at the problem the other way, disputing the
privileged speech value of the independent expenditure. More speech
7
or less speech: this is how the choice is portrayed.

4. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s refusal to apply strict scrutiny to contribution limits rests upon
Buckley’s discounting of the First Amendment interests at stake. The analytic foundation of
Buckley, however, was tenuous from the very beginning . . . .”
5. See, e.g., id. at 407 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the current framework “would be
unfortunate . . . if evolved from a deliberate legislative choice; but its unhappy origins are in
[the] earlier decree in Buckley, which by accepting half of what Congress did (limiting
contributions) but rejecting the other (limiting expenditures) created a misshapen system, one
which distorts the meaning of speech”); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518
U.S. 604, 631 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (starting, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Scalia: “I would reject the framework established by Buckley v. Valeo . . . .
Instead, I begin with the premise that there is no constitutionally significant difference between
campaign contributions and expenditures: both forms of speech are central to the First
Amendment’’).
6. See, e.g., Nixon, 528 U.S. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that if Buckley was
interpreted as “den[ying] the political branches sufficient leeway to enact comprehensive
solutions to the problems posed by campaign finance,” then “the Constitution would require
[the Court] to reconsider Buckley”); id. at 410–12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
Buckley discounts First Amendment interests).
7. The literature on the contribution/expenditure distinction is voluminous. For a
sampling of views on various sides of the issue, see generally Jocelyn Benson, Saving
Democracy: A Blueprint for Reform in the Post-Citizens United Era, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
723, 741–42 (2012); Lillian R. BeVier, Mandatory Disclosure, “Sham Issue Advocacy,” and
Buckley v. Valeo: A Response to Professor Hasen, 48 UCLA L. REV. 285 (2000); James Bopp,
Jr. & Susan Lee, So There are Campaign Contribution Limits that are Too Low, 18 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 266 (2007); Tom Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the
Political System: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 235 (2010).
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There is more, however, to the deficiencies of Buckley. It did not
capture the range of First Amendment interests at stake; “speech”
does not exhaust that range. Neither does its cousin—expressive
association. The missing dimension of the First Amendment analysis is
the interest in political action: the business of building coalitions and
acting in concert with allies and others to achieve common political
goals. This interest—one could call it “doing politics”—is irreducible
to speech interests alone.
The constitutional lens through which the Buckley debate has
been conducted leaves insufficient space for this critical interest in
“doing politics.” Restoring the interest in “doing politics” to the
discussion would contribute to understanding the unsatisfactory,
8
inconsistent, and confused applications of the current doctrine, and
would bring to light the costs exacted by the current doctrine’s
singular focus on speech interests as a concern separated from the
larger sphere of political action.
In bringing out more clearly this interest in “doing politics,” it is
instructive to review a major legislative and regulatory struggle of
recent years: distinguishing the truly independent expenditure from
the “sham” one that the candidate has somehow coordinated with the
9
spender. The question here has been how far the candidate or her
agents can go in collaborating with allies before effective politics
become the regulatory problem of illegal “coordination.” Over a
number of years, and increasing in urgency upon the enactment of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (McCain-Feingold), Congress, the
Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the courts attempted to
shape workable coordination rules. Political actors generally
supportive of regulatory reform, such as organized labor, questioned
the effect of these rules on coalition building and associational
10
activity. A large part of the problem seems to stem from the absence
8. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (“[I]ndependent
expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.”), with
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (holding that due process required
a state trial court judge to recuse himself from participation in a case where one party had made
significant independent expenditures in support of the judge’s campaign).
9. See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (assessing the constitutionality of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform’s Acts expenditure limits as applied to a non-profit corporation
that released a documentary critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton); McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003) (determining the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,
which, among other things, attempted to distinguish between independent expenditures and
coordinated contributions, and afforded different regulations for each).
10. See generally AFL-CIO, Comments on Proposed Rulemaking (Jan. 13, 2006), available
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of clarity about the interests at the heart of the dispute—the interest
in “doing politics.”
I. THE CONTRIBUTION/EXPENDITURE DISTINCTION AND
THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATED EXPENDITURES
The privileged place of the expenditure rests on the premise that
11
it is the spender’s speech. The spender’s speech is “independent”
speech—speech entirely the speaker’s own in content and in
distribution that is not directed by, made at the request or suggestion
of, or in concert or consultation with the candidate. Once the speech is
funded at the direction of or in close consultation with the candidate,
its character changes entirely and it becomes functionally
indistinguishable from the contribution provided to the candidate for
12
use as she pleases.
This latter type of contribution—in form an expenditure, but in
function just like a contribution—is known as a “coordinated
13
expenditure.” Much of the legislative and regulatory mission of
recent years has been directed toward distinguishing the coordinated
expenditure from the truly independent one and thus toward
determining which expenditures share the constitutionally less
14
protected status of contributions. To supporters of stricter limits on
campaign spending, the regulation of coordinated expenditures has
been lax, and the failure of regulators to police them has opened up a
massive loophole in the law through which expenditures flow on sham
15
claims of independence. One way or the other, organizations with
at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/coord_commun/comm25.pdf; AFL-CIO, Comments on
Proposed Rulemaking (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/coor_and_ind_
expenditures/afl-cio.pdf.
11. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1976) (explaining that “expenditures for
express advocacy of candidates made totally independently of the candidate and his campaign”
fall firmly under the protection of the First Amendment right to “‘speak one’s mind . . . on all
public institutions’” and are less dangerous because the potential for abuse is diminished by
their independent nature (citation omitted)).
12. See id. at 46 (“[E]xpenditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his
campaign . . . are treated as contributions rather than expenditures . . . .”).
13. See id. at 47 (describing the Act’s contribution ceiling as a measure to “prevent
attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to
disguised contributions”).
14. See, e.g., Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.); Coordinated Communications, 71 Fed.
Reg. 33190-02 (June 8, 2006) (“The Commission’s rules set out a three-prong test for
determining whether a communication is ‘coordinated’ with, and therefore an in-kind
contribution to, a Federal candidate or a political party committee.”).
15. E.g., Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Note, Loophole.com: How the FEC’s Failure to Fully
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plenty of money find ways to collude (i.e., coordinate) with candidates
16
or parties. But they deny it, of course.
Proponents of de-regulated politics reply that the government
inquiry into coordination, particularly its more subtle forms, would
17
simply erase the difference between contribution and expenditure.
After all, flat-out collusion is never really the issue. It may happen,
but if it does, few would deny that the expenditure loses its protected
character. The clash over the appropriate regulatory treatment of
coordination focuses much more on the means by which candidates or
parties steer expenditures by others that are nominally
“independent.” Maybe the independent expenditure is mapped out by
individuals who previously worked for the candidate or party, or by
the same media firm that works for the candidate. Or the candidate
and the party have had contact over the normal course of a political
relationship, creating an opportunity for strategically useful
information to pass from the candidate to the spender. If these are
cases of illegal “coordination,” skeptics of regulation argue, then
Congress will have a vast, unjustifiable authority to regulate
18
expenditures.
The controversy continues with little sign of abating. And here we
see a problem with a speech-centered analysis. In effect the choice
presented by the Buckley framework is between pure speech, fully
protected, and a less pure version—less pure because the speech has
been put to the service of political action and is intertwined with the
candidate. Speak at a distance, and you are safe; speak to or with allies
at close quarters, and regulatory pressures intensify.

Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1708–10
(2009).
16. See, e.g., Rachel Marcus & John Dunbar, Rules Against Coordination Between Super
PACs, Candidates Tough to Enforce, THE CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 13, 2012, 6:00
AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/01/13/7866/rules-against-coordination-between-superpacs-candidates-tough-enforce (describing the FEC’s investigation of Congressman Joe Schwarz
for improper coordination with Republican Main Street Partnership PAC).
17. E.g., Brad Smith, Clearing Up Confusion About American Crossroads and the Content
Standard Coordinated Expenditures, CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POL. (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2011/12/21/clearing-up-confusion-about-american-crossroadsand-the-content-standard-coordinated-expenditures/.
18. See, e.g., Center for Competitive Politics, Comments on Proposed Rulemaking at 5
(Jan. 13, 2006), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/coord_commun/comm02.pdf; Nat’l
Republican Campaign Comm., Comments on Proposed Rulemaking at 2 (Oct. 11, 2002),
available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/coor_and_ind_expenditures/nrcc.pdf.
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In recent years, following the enactment of McCain-Feingold in
2002, the escalated rulemaking and enforcement of “coordination”
rules has illustrated the difficulties resulting from slighting the
interest in political action.
II. THE FIGHT OVER “COORDINATION”
McCain-Feingold directed the repeal of the existing coordinated
expenditure rules and ordered a fresh FEC rulemaking process to
19
replace it. Congress specifically instructed the FEC to address cases
where spenders republished the candidate’s own materials or used
common vendors or former candidates and party employees to skirt
20
the requirement of true independence. Moreover, Congress barred
the new regulations from “requir[ing] agreement or formal
collaboration” between the candidate and spender in order “to
21
establish coordination.” As a result, it would be enough that
strategically useful information passed—by whatever manner of
22
suggestion, by “wink or nod”—from the candidate to the spender.
In the litigation over McCain-Feingold, the coordinated
expenditure provision came under attack along with others, but the
usual opponents of regulated campaign finance found an ally on this
issue in organized labor. The American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), a long-time
proponent of campaign finance reform, raised concerns that the
direction given to the agency was too vague and could result in
constitutionally
intolerable
interference
with
normal—and
indispensable—political communications and association. In its brief
23
to the Court in McConnell v. FEC, the AFL-CIO raised the issue
through a series of questions:
Does a political party “request or suggest” expenditures by third
parties when a party official publicly identifies the party’s principal
campaign themes and the states where the party hopes to prevail?
19. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 214(b). See also 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.1–109.37
(2013); 11 C.F.R. § 100.23 (2002) (repealed).
20. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 214(c).
21. Id.
22. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 221–22 (2003) (“[E]xpenditures made after a ‘wink
or nod’ often will be ‘as useful to the candidate as cash.’ For that reason, Congress has
always treated expenditures made ‘at the request or suggestion of’ a candidate as coordinated.”
(quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 442 (2001))).
23. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The Court consolidated a number of cases in McConnell, and the
AFL-CIO was appearing as an appellant from AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
and as an appellee from McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003).
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Is the result different if the same message is delivered in a
“private” strategy session, and, if so, how many party activists must
be present before a meeting loses its private character? Has a
union official acted “in cooperation . . . or concert with” a political
party if he meets with the party’s congressional leadership to plan
strategy in support of the party’s legislative agenda, including
union expenditures in support of that agenda? If a trade
association lobbyist participates in planning party activities during
the early stages of a campaign season, will the use of information
she has learned about the party’s plans turn all of her group’s
subsequent independent expenditures into contributions because
24
of improper “consultation”?

The AFL-CIO also argued that without a requirement of “agreement
or formal collaboration,” the rule Congress contemplated could not
pass constitutional muster: “[W]ithout proof of ‘agreement or formal
collaboration,’ the statutory provisions clearly reach a broad range of
conduct, including mere consultation with a candidate or party, which
25
is constitutionally protected.”
The AFL-CIO’s questions, coupled with the attention paid to
ongoing “consultation” with allies, suggest the nature of the interest
most threatened by free-ranging anti-coordination rules. It is a speech
interest, yes, in part, but also a strong associational interest: the
interest in effective coalitions and alliances with those, including
candidates and parties, who broadly share the AFL-CIO’s goals.
Moreover, investigative inquiry into “coordination” is not without
consequence: it further burdens the associational right, compounding
the doctrinal infirmities the AFL-CIO identified. The AFL-CIO
argued that regulatory enforcement can be “crippling” and
“intrusive,” involving “extensive discovery into the inner workings of
[an] organization” and requiring the release of “extraordinarily
sensitive political information [including] plans and strategies for
winning elections, materials detailing political and associational
activities, and personal information concerning hundreds of
26
employees, volunteers and members.”
The AFL-CIO lost its point with the Court. The five Justices
voting to uphold the better part of the reform were not troubled by

24. Brief of AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 36–37, McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (No.
02-1755).
25. Id. at 43.
26. Id. at 35 n.22 (quoting AFL-CIO v. FEC, 177 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51 (D.D.C. 2001)).
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27

the congressional initiative on coordination. Specifically, the Court
dismissed the AFL-CIO’s fear that without limiting any eventual rule
to agreements or formal collaboration, the FEC was sure to go too
28
far. The Court concluded that Congress has latitude to determine
29
that any independence a spender claims is “total.” Any limitation to
agreements or formal collaboration would tie the regulators’ hands
and defeat their inquiry into subterranean or surreptitious
maneuvers—the sort of inquiries the AFL-CIO described as
30
“crippling” and “intrusive.”
This was not the last word on the subject. The FEC promulgated
rules, reform organizations twice sued and won, and the rules were
31
twice revised. In the course of litigation, it became clear that the
courts were limited by Buckley’s conceptual apparatus in defining the
full range of interests implicated in these contested rules.
The FEC responded to the congressional directive in McCainFeingold by relaxing the regulation of communications disseminated
32
more than four months prior to an election. In those cases, the
communication would not be considered “coordinated”—that is,
treated as a contribution subject to investigation and limits—unless
the spender expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly
33
identified candidate. Mere reference to a candidate, coupled with
34
criticism of her position, would not be enough. The district court in
35
Shays v. Federal Election Commission rejected this approach, on the
ground that “coordinated communications expenditures [are]
contributions regardless of their content or when they are
36
broadcast.” On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
declined to go that far: The FEC could appropriately create “space for
collaboration between politicians and outsiders on legislative and
political issues involving only a weak nexus to any electoral

27. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 221–22 (“[W]e cannot agree with the submission that [the]
new [standard] is overbroad because it permits a finding of coordination or cooperation
notwithstanding the absence of a pre-existing agreement.”).
28. Id. at 221–23.
29. Id. at 223.
30. Id. at 221–23.
31. A reform organization sued the FEC in 2002, see Shays v. FEC (Shays I), 414 F.3d 76
(D.C. Cir. 2005), and again in 2006, see Shays v. FEC (Shays II), 528 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
32. See Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. 421-01 (Jan. 3, 2003).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004).
36. Id. at 64.
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37

campaign.” Thus, though the FEC had failed to give a “cogent
explanation” for the line it drew, there was such a line—one that
“separates election-related advocacy from other activity falling
38
outside [Federal Election Campaign Act’s] expenditure definition.”
The circuit court weighed the interest in ordinary course politics
against the government’s interest in regulating campaign finance, but
it did not precisely identify the former. This political interest follows
in part from Buckley—a right to speak on issues that are not deemed
sufficiently “election-related” to warrant the imposition of regulatory
39
limits. But there is also an interest, which Buckley only weakly
40
expresses, in a “space” for political activity—“collaboration between
politicians and outsiders on legislative and political issues”—that,
even with some election-related impact, should be able to proceed
41
without threat of regulatory limit or intervention. The circuit court in
Shays could not give this “space” its full articulation, hampered by the
speech focus of Buckley; the court’s analysis was confined to the
accepted boundaries of the Buckley argument, turning on whether the
speech in question was more “express” advocacy than “issues”
advocacy. In the end, the issue before the court in Shays was speech
and only speech, and in particular the nature of the speech, which in
turn determined the level of protection to which the speech was
entitled.
Eventually, the successive rounds of litigation concluded and the
coordination rules were settled. Yet, the arguments over the rules’
sufficiency have not ended. As the campaign laws have frayed, worn
42
somewhat thinner by Supreme Court adjudication, and as forms of
political action have changed with the advent of PACs and a freshly
assertive community of tax-exempt organizations like Crossroads
43
GPS, these arguments have acquired fresh intensity. Critics believe
that the rules are weak, bordering on useless, and that what is needed
37. Shays I, 414 F.3d 76, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
38. Id. at 100, 102.
39. Id. at 80.
40. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (“The First Amendment protects political
association as well as political expression.”).
41. Shays I, 414 F.3d at 99.
42. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); FEC v.
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
43. Matea Gold, Secret Donors Pour Millions of Dollars into Crossroads GPS, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/17/news/la-pn-secret-donors-pour-millionsof-dollars-into-crossroads-gps-20120417.
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is a set of restrictions on all the channels of communication between
super PACs, tax-exempts, and the candidates and parties that may
44
45
facilitate “collusion.” Their goal is “total independence.”
But the nature of the interest identified by the AFL-CIO in the
McConnell litigation bears closer examination. At issue was the
associational interest inherent in political organizing and concerted
action—an interest in action and not merely in expression. And the
standard debate on campaign finance, so preoccupied with the values
of “speech,” takes limited account of the associational interest and
46
may even be hostile to it. What constitutes organizing and concerted
action in the eyes of one observer may strike another as merely the
elements of a conspiracy.
III. “COORDINATION,” ASSOCIATION, AND CONCERTED
POLITICAL ACTION
Returning to the basic contribution and expenditure distinction, it
becomes possible to see the secondary position of the associational
interest in the Buckley framework, i.e., the interest that seems closest
in substance and spirit to the interest in concerted political action. A
contribution to a political organization is an act of pooling and
managing resources with others; it presents just the feature of
association—the drive to concerted action. The Court in Buckley was
more concerned with contributions as acts of speech, and as a diluted
form of such expression or speech by “proxy,” which could be subject
47
to greater regulatory control. For the Court, the associational
element was important only insofar as it was a form of expression, the
vehicle by which support is symbolically communicated:
44. See, e.g., Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, Campaign Finance: Remedies Beyond the
Court, 27 DEMOCRACY J. 38, 40 (Winter 2013) (“[T]he FEC regulations that govern whether a
group is considered to ‘coordinate’ its expenditures with a candidate or political party are so
permissive that they have proven more apt as a source of comedic inspiration than anything
else.”).
45. See, e.g., id. (claiming that new FEC regulations or a statutory definition of
coordination could achieve “whole, total, true” independence).
46. As Steven Bilakovics describes this spirit of anti-politics, “‘Politics’ has probably
always been something of a dirty word. In America today it seems exclusively and irretrievably
so.” STEVEN BILAKOVICS, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT POLITICS 1 (2012). He describes “general
contempt of contemporary politics” and rejection of “the available practices of politics . . . as a
means to make things better.” Id.
47. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (“While contributions may result in political
expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor.”).
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The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations also impinge
on protected associational freedoms. Making a contribution, like
joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a
candidate. In addition, it enables like-minded persons to pool their
resources in furtherance of common political goals. The Act’s
contribution ceilings thus limit one important means of associating
with a candidate or committee, but leave the contributor free to
become a member of any political association and to assist
personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candidates. And
the Act’s contribution limitations permit associations and
candidates to aggregate large sums of money to promote effective
48
advocacy.

According to the Court, this is a less serious problem from a
constitutional point of view than limits on “independent
expenditures”:
By contrast, the Act’s $1,000 limitation on independent
expenditures “relative to a clearly identified candidate” precludes
most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their
adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First
Amendment protection of the freedom of association. The Act’s
constraints on the ability of independent associations and
candidate campaign organizations to expend resources on political
expression “is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of
49
(their) adherents.”

The Court acknowledged the core associational value—that the
contribution “enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in
furtherance of common political goals”—but it decided that even if
the contributions hamper this collective political endeavor, “the
contributor [is still] free to become a member of any political
association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on
50
behalf of candidates.” In other words, in place of money, the
contributor can enjoy membership (does the Court mean here yet
another form of expression by affiliation?) or donate time.

48. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
49. Id. (citations omitted).
50. Id.
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But as Theda Skocpol has astutely observed, “money is important
for association building” and without it, or without enough of it, we
have diminished associational participation in civic and political life—
a problem exacerbated by reforms structured with a bias toward
“elevating the thinking individual over all kinds of group
51
mobilization.” And from a progressive perspective, Skocpol worries
that “intentionally or not, late-twentieth century . . . reforms have
pushed our polity away from true popular mobilization in politics,”
which has “further[ed] the tilt toward the rich and those with
52
advanced degrees.”
To the extent that coordination rules convert expenditures into
contributions, moving the money spent into less protected
communications, they do so on the premise that organizations
engaged in coordination are simply enhancing their election-related
53
speech. But, as the AFL-CIO pointed out, an organization may make
a wide variety of contacts in the course of building, maintaining, or
54
expanding its program of concerted political action. This is political
activity that we might define as an associational whole greater than its
constituent speech parts. Not all these contacts have as their goal or
end-point an advertising campaign, and not all public communications
that emerge after these contacts are directed toward elections rather
than, say, communication with officials and the public about public
55
policy matters.
One can imagine a hypothetical enforcement official wincing at
this statement and complaining, not unreasonably, that political
communications may be undertaken for a variety of purposes, and
that if the multiplicity of function or motive is enough to scuttle
inquiry or enforcement, then the rules will be largely worthless.
Communication between a donor and a party may serve other shared
51. THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT
IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 206, 282 (2004).
52. Id. at 282–83 (2004).
53. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (“[I]ndependent expenditures . . . provide little assistance
to the candidate’s campaign . . . . The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an
expenditure . . . not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.”). See also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 222–23 (2003)
(“Plaintiffs do not present any evidence that [the Federal Election Campaign Act’s definition of
coordination] has chilled political speech.”).
54. Brief of AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 24, at 7–8.
55. See, e.g., Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union to Sens. Sheldon Whitehouse and
Lindsey Graham at 3 (Apr. 9, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/4-9-13_-_campaign_finance_hearing_final.pdf.
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goals, like the passage of legislation, but it may also, as a matter of
fact, aid in coordinating election-related messages. The presence of
other benefits achieved from the communication does not excuse the
speaker for ignoring the electoral gain. To adopt willful blindness on
this point would only encourage political actors to construct
communications they can defend as primarily or at least partly
dedicated to other, non-campaign objectives.
This issue, not alone among campaign finance regulatory issues,
requires the balancing of risk and reward. The reward is a flexible
standard for judging coordination, allowing for tougher enforcement
and engendering a healthier wariness within the regulated community
about testing the boundaries of the law. The risk is raising the cost of
association understood as political action and making it that much
harder for alliances to be assembled and effectively managed. The law
as now constructed, and the proposals for strengthening it, are highly
attuned to the reward, but—so critics might say—less informed about
56
or sensitive to the risks. A campaign finance jurisprudence that
assigns so little weight to the associational interest in political action,
effectively defining it as a form and, for that matter, a lower-rung
form of the expressive interest, does not satisfactorily frame for
decision this question of balancing risk and reward.
By design, the enforcement of the coordination rules is necessarily,
on contemporary enforcement theory, invasive. Coordination rules
are meant to ferret out the sharing of information—the rules speak of
information transmitted about a candidate or party’s “plans, projects,
activities or needs”—and to determine whether this information was
57
material somehow to the fashioning of election-related speech.
Moreover, under these rules, investigators also consider the identities
of individuals involved in communications and whether they had
58
prior staff or professional relationships with the candidate or party.
As the AFL-CIO pointed out, active investigative inquiry into these
59
matters is in and of itself “intrusive.” Such is the case whenever the
questions asked about political communications are who said what,
when, and to whom.

56. See, e.g., id. at 3–4 (urging Congress to be wary of crafting rules that “chill[] legitimate
issue advocacy”).
57. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (2013) (defining a “coordinated communication”).
58. Id.
59. Brief of AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 24, at 34.
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The question about the current campaign finance doctrine’s
treatment of associational interests does not arise only in relation to
the operation of so-called outside groups, the super PACs and taxexempt advocacy groups. In recent years, the Supreme Court has held
that parties can spend freely on elections only if they do so
60
independently of their candidates. And McCain-Feingold, of course,
through its prohibition on party soft money, limited the resources
parties had available to spend without limit when adopting this
61
posture of “independence.” Strange as it may seem, parties are also
62
subject to coordination rules—that is, with their own candidates.
Perhaps there is no better illustration of the weak standing of the
associational interest—the interest in “doing politics”—as defined for
our purposes here.
IV. THINKING ABOUT THE INTEREST IN “DOING POLITICS”
The constitutional jurisprudence of the day takes political action
63
and effectively compresses it into individual speech units. Political
activity is valuable insofar as it accommodates acceptably each of
these speech units; it is made up of them and serves to organize and
64
transmit them. Hence the associational interest we recognize is an
expressive one. We associate to communicate views, and the
association per se is, as an interest, purely instrumental in character.
But, as Professor George Kateb has written, “to instrumentalize a
65
right is to invite abridgements of it.”
The question presented by these considerations is now to
reconceive First Amendment rights to encompass more than speech
rights, or association in its role as an expressive activity. Any
reimagining requires breaking free of the ingrained prejudice against
political action—politics as activity rather than as just a forum for the
66
expression of competing points of view. It is not surprising that in the
60. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996).
61. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 323(a)(1), 116 Stat.
81 (codified as amended in 2 U.S.C § 441i).
62. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(d)(3)(B)(4) (West 2013).
63. See, e.g., Shays I, 414 F.3d 76, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (framing the issue before the Court
as one concerning speech, and in particular the nature of the speech and the level of protection
to which it is entitled).
64. See, e.g., Robert F. Bauer, McConnell, Parties, and the Decline of the Right of
Association, 3 ELECTION L.J. 199, 199 (2004).
65. George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 53 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1998).
66. FRANK J. SORAUF, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 147 (1964) (“In

BAUER 2.15.2014 COPYRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE RIGHT TO “DO POLITICS” AND NOT JUST TO SPEAK

2/15/2014 2:48 PM

81

courts, or the academy, those who make their living through oral and
written expression have a particular view of politics—that is, of good
politics—rooted in their professional experience. Within this
community, naked appeals to self-interest, deal-making, and the
bewitchments of expensive, slickly produced media campaigns are
somewhat distasteful. People are not reasoning together; they are not
moving one another to consensus following an informed “debate on
the issues.” Politics is understood to call on baser instincts or on
strategies best pursued in the shadows, even if to some degree
67
necessarily so. But there are higher and lower forms of politics, and
persuasive speech occupies the high rung while political action in its
various gritty forms is found well below it.
Beyond this resistance to political action as almost morally
suspect and certainly inferior to the operation of the free speech
market, the character of political action is oversimplified to its
detriment. It includes speech, but more than speech: Action and
speech are inextricable in the realm of politics. One cannot be
divorced from the other in this realm, one in which individuals
68
interacting as equals strive in concert to fashion what is new. People
talk and argue with each other, build and re-build coalitions, both
temporary and more enduring ones; they speak while they organize,
and organize through speech, and this political space is alive with
noise and energy. Often, case law assumes that politics exists to serve
69
speech, whereas, in the sense intended here, speech serves politics,
and action and speech are the constituent and interdependent parts of
political life. Hannah Arendt reminds us that the “promise of politics”
resides in part in rescuing for action its proper place: In the Greek
conception of the polis, “speech itself was from the start considered a
70
form of action.”

the most general way one can, however, point to the widespread American suspicion of and
distaste for politics and politicians as the basic element of the American political culture.”).
67. See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, Politics and Moral Character, in MORAL LUCK 55
(1981) (“It is widely believed that the practice of politics selects at least for cynicism and
perhaps for brutality in its practitioners.”).
68. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE PROMISE OF POLITICS 125–26 (2007).
69. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 64, at 199 (noting that the Court in Buckley assessed
“[r]estrictions on expenditures—on direct speech”—under strict scrutiny, whereas
“[c]ontribution restrictions, more immediately significant in the Court’s view to the exercise of
associational rights” were treated differently); id. at 201 (discussing the McConnell Court’s
refusal to “reevaluate the associational issues,” which the parties raised more directly in
McConnell than in Buckley).
70. ARENDT, supra note 68, at 125.
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Of what does this action consist? It is in essence an effort to
“initiate a sequence, to forge a new chain,” and the political leader is
the one who, in the launch of initiative—in taking action—“[seeks]
71
out companions to help him carry it out.” Central to this concept is
the assembly of men and women, which is a coming together, to
pursue collective purposes. Unlike the unitary focus on speech—on
self-expression—action must be pursued through the citizens in active
engagement with one another, for, once again in Arendt’s words, “it is
only action that cannot even be imagined outside the society of
72
men.” It is a realm of freedom, properly valued (rather than
questioned skeptically) on its own terms. It is the antithesis of mere
rule, through which an elite issues orders to followers expected to
obey them. As Arendt explained: “[T]he commonplace notion . . . that
every political community consists of those who rule and those who
73
are ruled . . . rests on a suspicion of action.”
In contemporary terms, political action might be imagined as the
74
means by which strategies are formulated and executed. Political
strategy, in turn, depends on speech: speech among those who are
devising the strategy, and speech as a means of executing the strategy
in various ways to enlist the support of others. In a speech-centered
vision of politics, the strategic uses of speech are questioned as tools
75
of manipulation and misrepresentation. If speech is reasoned
discourse, disciplined by particular conventions of logic and evidence,
then politically strategic speech presents in all its rhetorical flourishes,
its appeals to emotion, and its frequent evasions and hair-splitting, the
antithesis of what a healthy polity needs. Yet moral qualms about
strategy, while reflecting in part a healthy suspicion of politics, can
slide easily into derogation of the political sphere and fail to grasp the
indispensability of action to concrete political achievement.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 126.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22 (2d ed. 1998).
Id. at 222.
GEORGE BEAM & DICK SIMPSON, POLITICAL ACTION: THE KEY TO
UNDERSTANDING POLITICS 17 (1984).
75. See BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE AMERICAN LIE 193 (2007) (“[Many candidates for
high office] habitually stretch the truth as it serves their political purposes. . . . [P]oliticians
construct a variety of imaginative fibs to present self-serving conduct as actually serving broader
public purposes, to build or demolish political coalitions or to mobilize and energize their
supporters.”). See also BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION 2 (2009) (“In trying to
persuade, democratic politicians may end up manipulating their audiences, or they may end up
pandering to them.”).
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The disregard of action in a speech-centered view of the First
Amendment is not without a political bias consequence. Giving pride
of place to “reasoned discourse” is advantageous to those with the
skills to speak persuasively or the means to produce much of the
speech that they hope is persuasive. In other words, the financial and
educated elites stand to do well when jurisprudence favors speech at
the expense of action, and when jurisprudence values persuasion over
strategic uses of speech as an imperative of effective action. And even
where the courts have looked out for the little guy, seeking in
campaign finance to protect the rights of those of lesser means, the
76
outcome has been quite different than expected. The doctrine of free
speech designed in part to benefit the “little guy” has become,
contrary to original judicial intent, a constitutional shield for the “big
77
guy.”
A shift in First Amendment theory toward the affirmative
recognition of political action does not require superimposing on the
constitutional text an alien conception. Recent scholarship has sought
to recover something like this complex compound of speech and
action in addressing the early history and then gradual decay of the
78
rights to assembly and petition. Each of these rights has virtually
vanished from contemporary jurisprudence—thirty years have passed
79
without a Supreme Court decision based on the right of assembly. In
each case, a conception of collective political action has been
80
subordinated to the primacy of the right to speech. Moreover,
neither is fairly represented by a right to association, which is defined
in modern terms by its expressive function and uninformed by any
notion of the independent value of action.
Yet the right to petition, before it faded from the case law, offered
a perfect “hybrid” right combining speech and action—a right that
blended “speech, mass assembly, and association as part and parcel
81
of . . . law reform efforts.” The right of assembly, before its
76. Robert Bauer, Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law
Symposium: First the Little Guy, Then the Big Guy (Feb. 8, 2012), available at
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=47501.
77. Id.
78. See generally John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565
(2010) (discussing the importance of the freedom of assembly to social movements in earlier
American history and its gradual decay over the past few decades).
79. JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 62
(2012).
80. See supra notes 11–12, 27–30 and accompanying text.
81. RONALD KROTOSZYNSKI, RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE 11, 82 (2012).
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annexation to speech rights, encompassed “far more than the right to
82
83
hold a meeting.” As a “right to gather and exist in groups,” the right
of assembly partook of the same character as petitioning—an activity
involving the coming together of individuals who shared and pursued
the same political objectives. Both the rights to assemble and petition
were integral to movement politics, particularly the abolition and
84
women’s movements of the nineteenth century. And movement
politics depend on a sustained, strategically pursued commitment to
85
effective political action. This constitutional heritage is available for
reclamation by building into the scope of First Amendment interests a
right to political action.
CONCLUSION
Writing in 1997, when an early version of McCain-Feingold was
under consideration but the reform was still five years off, John B.
Judis worried that organized politics was receiving inadequate
attention. Organizations, he wrote, are “really the only way for
86
individuals who are not billionaires to exert power.” To counter
inequality in the economic system, “average citizens . . . had to
organize in labor unions, civil rights organizations, civic organizations,
and other associations, and they had to work through the political
87
parties.”
So, Judis concluded, political reform, far from seeking to eliminate
or curb organized interests, should be structured to encourage them—
so that “organized interests of workers and citizens can contend
88
equally with those of business and the wealthy.” What he describes
as law’s proper aim takes fully into account how political strategies
are developed in consultation among allies who then proceed to act in
pursuit of their common goals. Their interest lies very specifically in
this action—in a right to act, and not just to speak.
82. INAZU, supra note 79, at 33.
83. Id.
84. Inazu notes the multiple and interrelated purposes served by activities organized
through and in support of movement politics. The “open air” campaigns developed by
suffragettes attracted national press, facilitated the acquisition of organizing capabilities, and
established a sense of partnership and solidarity among the participants. Id. at 45.
85. James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 292–93 (1990).
86. John B. Judis, Goo-Goos Versus Populists, 30 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT 12, 13
(1997).
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id.
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To recognize this right to act—to “do politics”—will require the
re-evaluation of deeply held assumptions about politics, and a
reworking of the framework that has prized only the most isolated
form of speech, the speech disconnected from action, and accorded
the weakest protections to the type of speech that links us together
and presents itself in the form of concerted political enterprise. To
value action, we have to value, not distrust, collective political action
and the strategies through which it is effected.

